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Pick a Number, Any Number: State
Representation in Congress After the
2000 Census
Paul H. Edelmant & Suzanna Sherryl
The Y2K bug was not the year 2000's only claim to fame. The United
States Constitution requires a census, and subsequent reapportionment of
Congress, every ten years,' and thus we are once again faced with the
apportionment follies. The most well-known act in this decennial struggle
between law and mathematics is the battle that begins in every state legisla-
ture and ultimately spills over into the federal courts: drawing up districts
in each state that are consistent not only with the one-person-one-vote
principle of Reynolds v. Sims,2 but also with the perceived needs of interest
groups and incumbents. That the state of North Carolina has made four
trips to the Supreme Court as a result of the 1990 round of reapportionment
shows both the complexity and the staying power of this particular
problem.3
The requirement of a decennial reapportionment also raises another
issue, less well-known but perhaps even more interesting. Although the
Constitution says that the seats in the House of Representatives must be
apportioned among the states according to population, it does not specify
the method of apportionment except to command that each state have at
least one representative.4 Figuring out how to allocate the 435 seats among
the states, however, is not a trivial matter. Over the past two centuries
Congress has used four different methods to allocate representation among
the states, and each method produces quite different results.
As is to be expected, the size of a state's representation in Congress
can be a contentious issue. Utah has already filed a federal lawsuit
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nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
4. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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challenging its 2000 congressional allocation on the ground that the census
regulations unfairly excluded some Utah citizens temporarily living over-
seas.5 The House has agreed to delay certification of the seat, which would
otherwise go to North Carolina, until the Supreme Court can rule on the
question.6 Similar issues will certainly arise again in 2010. In addition to
this challenge, various scholars have questioned the fairness of Congress's
current method of allocation.7 The purpose of this Essay is to calculate,
using the 2000 census figures, the number of representatives to which each
state would be entitled under each of the methods used by Congress at one
time or another. The patterns that emerge might help shape the ensuing
debate over which method is the most satisfactory.
A brief history of apportionment in the House and a basic description
of each of the four methods used may be useful as background.8 Each of
the four methods starts with the basic principle that a state's fraction of the
House seats should be the same as its fraction of the total United States
population. Unfortunately, however, performing the simple calculation that
will yield that ratio, (state population - total population) x total House
size, rarely yields a whole number, and will almost certainly not yield a
whole number for every state. Since one cannot allocate a fraction of a rep-
resentative, this "perfect" but fractional number of representatives must be
rounded into a number of actual whole people.9 The four methods each
provide different instructions for carrying out this rounding.
5. Michael Janofsky, Utah, in Census War, Fights North Carolina for House Seat, N.Y TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2001, at A18. As this Essay went to press, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
ruling against Utah. Utah v. Evans, 70 U.S.L.W. 3147 (Nov. 26, 2001).
6. Id.
7. See MICHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE
IDEAL OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 67-70 (2d ed. 2001); DONALD G. SAARI, GEOMETRY OF VOTING 317
(1994); Garrett Birkhoff, House-Monotone Apportionment Schemes, 73 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA
684-86 (1976); see also Book Note, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1028, 1032 (1984) (reviewing a previous edition
of BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra, and suggesting that "Congress would do well to take note" of their
proposal). The Supreme Court has indicated that the method of apportionment is largely within
Congress's discretion. See United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 464 (1992)
("[Congress's] apparently good-faith choice of a method of apportionment of Representatives among
the several States 'according to their respective Numbers' commands far more deference than a state
districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid mathematical standard.").
8. For a more detailed history of congressional struggles with apportionment, see United States
Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 447-57. See also Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785
F. Supp. 230, 244-51 (D. Mass 1992), rev'dsub nom. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992);
BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7.
9. "Rounding" is something of a misnomer. Contrary to one's intuition about how rounding
works, the various methods can end up giving states a total number that is more than one away (either
plus or minus) from their "perfect" number. Thus it is not "rounding" in the most common sense of the
term. Indeed, this is a surprising feature of the various methods, and difficult to explain mathematically.
An example may be found in the table at pages 219-20 (with a "perfect" representation of 52.45,
California receives from 50 to 55 representatives under the various methods), and an explanation in
BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 79-83.
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After the 1790 census, Alexander Hamilton favored the simplest and
most straightforward method. That method first rounds each state's
"perfect" number of representatives down to the nearest whole number,
yielding a House made up of too few representatives. Representatives are
then added to each state's allocation in the order of the size of the original,
rounded-away fraction, until the desired number of total representatives is
reached." In other words, after the initial downward rounding, the missing
representatives are added back in, starting with the states whose rounded
number is the furthest from their "perfect" representation. Thus a state
entitled to 6.9 representatives would start with six representatives, and then
get its seventh before any state whose "perfect" representation ended in a
number lower than .9 received another representative. Although Hamilton
persuaded Congress to adopt this method, George Washington vetoed the
bill at the urging of Thomas Jefferson and convinced Congress to enact
Jefferson's preferred method instead."
Jefferson's method also begins, in essence, by rounding down the
"perfect" number of representatives, but uses a different method of adding
the missing representatives back in. Instead of adding them back in
directly, depending on the size of the fraction that had been rounded off,
Jefferson changed the calculation bit by bit until it yielded the desired total
number of representatives. 2 Here's how it works: The "perfect" number of
representatives, described above by the equation (state population - total
population) x total House size, can also be described as state population +
average district size. 3 The average district size, of course, is calculated by
dividing the total population by the total number of representatives. The
two equations yield identical numbers, but the latter description allows a
different rounding method. If one slowly shrinks the average district size,
one will slowly increase the number of representatives each state is entitled
to. At some point along this continuum, rounding each state's representa-
tion down to the nearest whole number will produce the desired number of
total representatives. Jefferson's method, however, was subject to the
legitimate, and increasingly vociferous, charge that it favored large states. 4
In 1842, Congress rejected Jefferson's method as unfair.15
10. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 17.
11. Id.atl8-21.
12. Id. at 18.
13. For those who have forgotten their sixth-grade arithmetic, the equation (a + b) x c is
equivalent to a + (b + c). Thus, (state population + total population) x total House size is equivalent to
state population + (total population - total House size). The denominator is, as noted in the text, the
average district size. Thus, state population + average district size is equivalent to (state population -
total population) x total House size.
14. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 13, 23. Jefferson's method favors large states
because they lose a smaller percentage of their total "perfect" representation when the fractional part of
it is rounded away. For example, .3 is almost 10% of 3.3 but only about 3% of 10.3.
15. Id.at34-35.
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The next method of allocating representatives had an equally illustri-
ous parentage and an even shorter life. Daniel Webster devised, and
Congress adopted, a method that treated small and large states equally by
changing the rounding formula once again. 6 Under Webster's method,
each state's "perfect" allocation is rounded either up or down, depending
on whether the fraction is equal to, greater than, or less than half-the
rounding method we all learned in elementary school. Depending on the
exact size of each fraction, this might yield a House of Representatives that
is too large, too small, or just right. If the House was smaller than desired,
Webster adopted Jefferson's tactic of slowly shrinking the average district
size until the total number of representatives was achieved. If the House
was larger than desired, Webster simply enlarged the average district size.
We leave as an exercise for the reader what happened if the initial rounding
produced a House of the desired size. While Webster's method favored
neither small nor large states, it still produced what were seen as discrep-
ancies in representation; states with nearly equal population might in some
cases get the same number of representatives and in some cases get differ-
ent numbers. Thus, Congress tried again in 1850.
The replacement for Webster's method was actually not new: it was
simply Hamilton's idea recycled by Ohio Representative Samuel Vinton. 7
It is a lovely method with but one serious flaw, known as the Alabama
paradox. In 1880, Congress desired to expand the size of the House. It
asked the chief clerk of the Census Office, C.W. Seaton, to calculate states'
allocations for a House of various sizes between 275 and 350.8 Using the
1880 census data, Seaton discovered a curious fact: Alabama lost a repre-
sentative if the size of the House went up from 299 to 300.19 Hamilton's
method thus produced changes in representation without any changes in
population, a serious problem indeed. Congress finessed the problem by
choosing a number (325) that did not produce any such anomaly, and under
which Hamilton's and Webster's methods reached the same apportion-
ment.20 The same solution was used in 1891, when the House expanded to
356.21
In 1901, however, politics again reared its ugly head. Using
Hamilton's method, Congress considered all House sizes between 350 and
400.22 Several states' allocations bounced around: Maine's allocation, for
16. The description of Webster's method in this paragraph is taken from BALINSKi & YOUNG,
supra note 7, at 32.
17. Id. at 37.
18. Id. at38.
19. For an easily understood mathematical explanation of the paradox, see BALINSKi & YOUNG,
supra note 7, at 39.
20. Id. at 40.
21. Id.
22. The description of the struggle over the 1900 census in this paragraph is taken from BALINSKI
& YOUNG, supra note 7, at 40.
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example, was 3 at all House sizes between 350 and 382, 4 if the House
contained between 383 and 385 members, back to 3 for a House size of
precisely 386, and so forth. But it was Colorado's allocation that proved to
be the downfall of Hamilton's method. Under every House size except 357
members, Colorado would be entitled to 3 representatives. But if the House
was set at exactly 357 members, Colorado would have only 2 seats.
Colorado, however, was a Populist state, and the chairman of the commit-
tee that was considering the issue was anti-Populist. The committee bill
proposed expanding the House to 357.
It is safe to say that all hell broke loose. It was Maine Representative
John Littlefield who railed most eloquently against the Hamiltonian
method that produced such havoc: "God help the State of Maine when
mathematics reach for her and undertake to strike her down!"23 Congress
expanded the size of the House to 386, and without changing Vinton's law
specifying Hamilton's method, simply dictated the number of representa-
tives allotted to each state, using Webster's method for the actual calcula-
tions.24 Congress did essentially the same thing in 1910, specifying a
House size that did not cause any state to lose a representative and per-
forming the actual calculation using Webster's method.2
With Vinton's Hamiltonian method still the official guide to congres-
sional apportionment, Congress escaped serious controversy over the 1920
census by the simple expedient of not reapportioning at all (unconstitu-
tional, but apparently unchallenged).26 As the 1930 census approached,
however, Congress began to get nervous. With the help of Edward Hunt-
ington, a Harvard professor of mathematics, Congress and the chief statis-
tician of the Census Bureau, Joseph Hill, came up with a refined version of
Webster's method. 7
Hill's method, also known as the method of equal proportions, fol-
lows Webster's except that the point of rounding is different. Instead of
rounding up or down depending on whether the fraction is higher or lower
than .5, Hill's method rounds up or down depending on whether the frac-
tion is higher or lower than the geometric mean of the two adjacent inte-
gers.28 One consistent effect of Hill's refinement is that it is kinder to small
states. Using the 1920 census data, for example, Hill and Webster produce
different allocations for six states. Hill's method gives New York, North
Carolina, and Virginia each one fewer representative than Webster's does,
23. 34 CONG. RFc. H591-93 (1901).
24. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 42.
25. Id. at 47.
26. Id. at 51.
27. Id. at 47-50.
28. Id. at 48-50. The geometric mean of two numbers is the square root of their product. Thus
while the mean of 4 and 5 is 4.5, the geometric mean is 4.47. Therefore Webster's method would round
4.49 down, while Hill's would round it up.
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concomitantly adding a representative apiece to the allocations of Rhode
Island, New Mexico, and Vermont, whose combined populations do not
reach the population of Virginia, the smallest of the three states disfavored
under Hill's method.z9
In 1929, Congress passed a bill requiring the Census Bureau to pro-
vide, for the 1930 census, the apportionment figures obtained from both the
Webster method and the Hill method.3' Although the bill also gave
Congress the power to choose between the two methods, in the end that
provision proved unnecessary: the 1930 population produced identical ap-
portionments under both methods.3' Congress had dodged the bullet once
more.
The 1940 census forced Congress to the test. Once again, calculations
were performed using both Hill and Webster. 32 Almost but not quite identi-
cal, Hill's method gave 7 seats to Arkansas and 17 to Michigan while
Webster's allocated 6 to Arkansas and 18 to Michigan. Arkansas, like the
majority in both the House and the Senate, was Democratic, while
Michigan tended to vote Republican. Webster never had a chance. In 1941
Congress passed, and President Roosevelt signed, a law designating Hill's
as the method of choice for that and all future congressional apportion-
ment.33 Hill's method has been used ever since.
Thus a combination of politics, mathematics, and serendipity con-
spired over time to produce four different methods of apportionment, each
with distinct advantages and disadvantages. Which should we choose?
The criterion for choice is simple, but its application defies solution.
We should, of course, choose the system that produces the fairest alloca-
tion. But what "fair" means is a question that has bedeviled politicians and
scholars alike.34 So rather than defining fairness, we provide a comparison
of the various numbers, make a few observations, and let the reader draw
her own conclusions.
One last matter warrants discussion. We all unthinkingly assume that
the House, unlike the Senate, is purely proportionate. That is not quite true,
however; in addition to the inevitable discrepancies that arise because of
rounding, the Constitution adds another wrinkle. Under all the methods
except Hill's, it is possible to reach a result that entitles one or more states
29. Id. at 50.
30. Id. at 57.
31. Id.
32. The description of the events after the 1940 census in this paragraph is taken from BALINSKI
& YOUNG, supra note 7, at 57-58.
33. See 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994).
34. See, e.g., H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 43-44 (1994); STEVEN J.
BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION (1996).
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to no representatives at all." The simplest example comes using
Hamilton's method: a state whose "perfect" representation was .3 would
have its representation rounded down to zero, and would be unlikely to
receive an additional representative before the numbers ran out. Since that
result is flatly prohibited by the Constitution, how should we remedy it?
There are two possible solutions to this "zero problem." One is simply
to tinker with the results at the end to avoid the unconstitutional result. If,
for example, Wyoming and Vermont end up with no representatives, we
take the last two representatives allocated to other states and give them to
Wyoming and Vermont instead. Thus, again using the same example, and
assuming that Wyoming and Vermont are each entitled to .3 representa-
tives, we might end up taking a representative away from each of the two
states whose fractions were, say, 10.31 and 7.32, and instead give them to
the two forlorn but mathematically undeserving states. All of the scholars
who have previously addressed the question have assumed that this is the
best way to remedy the problem. 36 But there is another solution to the prob-
lem of a state without representation: eliminate the possibility that the
problem will ever arise. We can do this by first giving each state one repre-
sentative, and only then calculating the apportionment of the remaining
385, using whichever method we favor.
These two responses to the zero problem will often produce dramati-
cally different allocations, as the table below demonstrates. Using
Jefferson's method of rounding, almost half the states (23) receive different
allocations depending on how we accommodate the zero problem. Like the
choice of methods of rounding, then, how we deal with the zero problem
raises normative questions of fairness and constitutional interpretation.
While a definitive statement about the relative fairness of the two
methods is as elusive as deciding which of the original methods of round-
ing is fairest, a few words can be said about the two solutions. The way we
resolve the zero problem can be viewed as a choice between two perspec-
tives on the constitutional guarantee that each state have at least one repre-
sentative: Is it an affirmative entitlement or a backstop? That is, should we
think of each state's first representative as its due, or should we think of the
guarantee as a method of ensuring that no state is left without representa-
tion? There is not a sharp line between the two perspectives, but they lead
us in different directions. The entitlement perspective suggests that we
ought to deal out one representative to each state before we make any fur-
ther allocations; the backstop perspective suggests that we need only con-
front the zero problem if it actually arises, and then by making the
35. The reason that Hill's method cannot result in an allocation of zero representatives to any
state is that the geometric mean of 1 and 0 is 0 rather than .5. Thus, any number between 0 and 1 will
be rounded to 1.
36. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 186 nn.1, 3, 6; YOUNG, supra note 34, at 59.
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minimum number of changes necessary to prevent the unconstitutional
result.
So which is the better interpretation of the constitutional language that
prohibits an allocation of zero? This, of course, is not a question that the
Founding generation confronted directly. They had their hands full
deciding between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian views, on this as well
as on many other questions of constitutional significance. The disparities in
population among the states were also smaller, and the likelihood of any
state receiving no representatives under any method of allocation was slim.
Indeed, the problem of an allocation of zero did not actually arise until the
mid-nineteenth century.37
Nevertheless, we can draw a few tentative conclusions from the rele-
vant constitutional language and history. The prohibition on depriving any
state of representation in the House appears almost as an afterthought. No
such provision appeared in the earliest draft of the Constitution, written by
the Committee on Detail more than halfway through the Constitutional
Convention." John Dickinson of Delaware, the smallest state represented
at the Convention, suggested a few days later that the phrase be added, and
the delegates agreed without discussion.39 The initial absence of any guar-
antee, its introduction by a delegate from a small state that might have
feared losing representation, and the lack of any controversy all suggest
that the clause was designed as a final safeguard rather than as a prelimi-
nary entitlement.
The language is similarly suggestive. The relevant paragraph of
Article I, Section 2 begins by specifying the basic rule of proportional rep-
resentation, then provides for a first census within three years and subse-
quent ones at least every ten years. The next sentence sets a minimum size
of congressional districts-no smaller than 30,000 people-and continues,
"but each State shall have at least one representative." Both the placement
of the limiting language and its introduction with the word "but" suggest
that the allocation of a numerically undeserved representative to a state that
would otherwise have none is an exception to the Constitution's theories of
37. The first time a state's "perfect" representation (or "quota") fell below one was in 1850. That
year both Florida and Delaware had a quota below one. Hamilton's method, in use at that time, ended
up allocating a single representative to each state, so Congress did not need to confront the zero
problem. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 162-63 (calculation performed by authors). In the
1860s, however, the application of Hamilton's method to Oregon's quota of .428 would have deprived
that state of any representation. Perhaps for other reasons, Congress solved the problem by simply
adding eight seats, allocating them all to Northern states (including one to Oregon). BALINSKI &
YOUNG, supra note 7, at 37. The mathematical effect, however, was equivalent to taking one seat from
Alabama and giving it to Oregon. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 162-63 (calculation
performed by authors).
38. See Notes by James Madison (Aug. 6, 1787), in NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 385-96 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (hereinafter
Madison's Notes).
39. Id. at413.
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representation. In other words, the requirement of at least one representa-
tive per state is a protection against deprivation rather than an affirmative
entitlement. Also mitigating against an entitlement theory is a glaring
absence: although the Constitution provides that no state shall be deprived
without its consent of its equal suffrage in the Senate, there is no similar
language regarding representation in the House.4" Presumably, then, a later
generation could amend the Constitution to dictate that a state whose popu-
lation would mathematically entitle it to zero representatives could be
given exactly that number. Not much of an entitlement.
Thus it seems fair to conclude that tinkering with the results at the end
is a better remedy than allocating one representative to each state at the
beginning. Nevertheless, in the interests of full disclosure, we have calcu-
lated apportionment both ways for Jefferson's method, which is the only
method under which any state would otherwise receive no representatives
for the 2000 census.41
With that background, we present the various 2000 allocations in the
table below, and conclude with a few comments.
S 0 0 -o 8 0
(D can) 0) E2 co U)
2000= a - ( 0 )0 M
State Population -- T_
California 33,930,798 52.45 53 55 50 53 52
Texas 20,903,994 32.31 32 33 31 32 32
New York 19,004,973 29.38 29 30 28 29 29
Florida 16,028,890 24.78 25 26 24 25 25
Illinois 12,439,042 19.23 19 20 19 19 19
Pennsylvania 12,300,670 19.01 19 ,19 19 19 19
Ohio 11,374,540 17.58 18 18 17 18 18
Michigan 9,955,829 15.39 15 16 15 15 15
New Jersey 8,424,354 13.02 13 13 13 13 13
Georgia 8,206,975 12.69 13 13 13 13 13
North Carolina 8,067,673 12.47 13 13 12 13 13
Virginia 7,100,702 10.98 11 11 11 11 11
Massachusetts 6,355,568 9.82 10 10 10 10 10
Indiana 6,090,782 9.41 9 9 9 9 9
40. U.S. CONST. art. V.
41. In the table that follows, "Jefferson r' refers to the method by which the allocation is tinkered
with at the end, and "Jefferson II' refers to the method in which each state is given a representative and
the remainder are divided according the usual Jefferson method.
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Washington 5,908,684 9.13 9 9 9 9 9
Tennessee 5,700,037 8.81 9 9 9 9 9
Missouri 5,606,260 8.67 9 9 9 9 9
Wisconsin 5,371,210 8.30 8 8 8 8 8
Maryland 5,307,886 8.20 8 8 8 8 8
Arizona 5,140,683 7.95 8 8 8 8 8
Minnesota 4,925,670 7.61 8 7 8 8 8
Louisiana 4,480,271 6.93 7 7 7 7 7
Alabama 4,461,130 6.90 7 7 7 7 7
Colorado 4,311,882 6.66 7 7 7 7 7
Kentucky 4,049,431 6.26 6 6 6 6 6
South Carolina 4,025,061 6.22 6 6 6 6 6
Oklahoma 3,458,819 5.35 5 5 6 5 5
Oregon 3,428,543 5.30 5 5 6 5 5
Connecticut 3,409,535 5.27 5 5 6 5 5
Iowa 2,931,923 4.53 5 4 5 5 5
Mississippi 2,852,927 4.41 4 4 5 4 4
Kansas 2,693,824 4.16 4 4 4 4 4
Arkansas 2,679,733 4.14 4 4 4 4 4
Utah 2,236,714 3.46 3 3 4 3 4
Nevada 2,002,032 3.09 3 3 3 3 3
New Mexico 1,823,821 2.82 3 2 3 3 3
West Virginia 1,813,077 2.80 3 2 3 3 3
Nebraska 1,715,369 2.65 3 2 3 3 3
Idaho 1,297,274 2.01 2 2 2 2 2
Maine 1,277,731 1.98 2 2 2 2 2
New Hampshire 1,238,415 1.91 2 2 2 2 2
Hawaii 1,216,642 1.88 2 1 2 2 2
Rhode Island 1,049,662 1.62 2 1 2 2 2
Montana 905,316 1.40 1 1 2 1 1
Delaware 785,068 1.21 1 1 2 1 1
South Dakota 756,874 1.17 1 1 2 1 1
North Dakota 643,756 0.995 1 1 1 1 1
Alaska 628,933 0.97 1 1 1 1 1
Vermont 609,890 0.94 1 1 1 1 1
Wyoming 495,304 0.77 1 1 1 1 1
[Vol. 90:211
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We might make a few observations about these numbers. As expected,
Jefferson's method, ab initio (Jefferson I), favors large states: the five
largest states gain between 1 and 3 representatives each as compared to the
other basic methods.42 Perhaps the smaller states were right to be afraid, in
debates over the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, of creating an
overly powerful Virginia delegation. The fear was that the large states
would band together to further their common interests, trampling the
smaller states as they went. As Gunning Bedford of Delaware put it:
[The large states] insist that although the powers of the general
government will be increased, yet it will be for the good of the
whole; and although the three great States form nearly a majority
of the people of America they will never hurt or injure the lesser
states. I do not, gentlemen, trust you. If you possess the power, the
abuse of it could not be checked; and what then would prevent you
from exercising it to our destruction?43
Madison's response to this concern was to point out that "the States were
divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other
circumstances."' In other words, he argued, Virginia had more in common
with little Georgia than she did with populous New York.
Comparing Jefferson's method with the current method (Hill's) gives
us some anecdotal insight into this dispute. Jefferson's method adds two
representatives to California's allocation, and one each to those of Texas,
New York, Florida, Illinois, and Michigan, and subtracts one each from
those of seven states: Minnesota, Iowa, New Mexico, West Virginia,
Nebraska, Hawaii, and Rhode Island. Since 2000 was also the year of the
most hotly contested election, and the closest electoral college vote, in over
a hundred years, it is interesting to ask whether the results would have been
different had Jefferson's allocation been in effect rather than Hill's. The
answer is no. Gore would have gained 5 electoral votes-2 from California
and 1 each from New York, Illinois, and Michigan-and lost 5 electoral
votes-from Minnesota, Iowa, New Mexico, Hawaii, and Rhode Island.
Bush would have gained 2 electoral votes-from Texas and Florida-and
lost 2-from West Virginia and Nebraska. It seems that Madison was
right: it's not necessarily size that determines common interests.
Notice that the strangest results occur when we adapt Jefferson's
method by allocating a single representative to each state and then calcu-
late the apportionment of the remaining 385 (Jefferson II). The largest
state, California, suddenly loses 5 representatives, and its allocation is now
42. We exclude here the further embellishment provided by changing the way that Jefferson's
method addresses the zero problem (Jefferson II).
43. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 125
(1990) (quoting notes of Robert Yates as reprinted in TANSILL, DOCUMIENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398 (1st Sess. 1927)).
44. Madison's Notes (June 30, 1787), supra note 38, at 224.
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lower than under any of the other methods. Fourteen of the smallest
twenty-four states gain a representative compared to their allocation under
Jefferson I, with six of them, but not the smallest six, receiving an
allocation larger than under any other method. For a system that was
designed solely to guarantee that no state would be deprived of any repre-
sentation, these are extremely odd results, further suggesting that the better
solution to the zero-representative problem is to tinker with the results at
the end.
Hill's method and Webster's method happen to produce, as they did in
1930, identical results, but as the 1920 and 1940 census data show, this is
not always true. What is even more interesting, however, is that the alloca-
tion under Hamilton's method is also very similar. But the difference may
turn out to be important, for Hamilton's method happens to give an extra
seat to one state and one state only: Utah.45 So once again, an essentially
political dispute may end up in the judiciary.46 The year 2000 seems, in the
end, to be the year of the Court.
45. It comes at the expense of California, which is reduced from 53 to 52 representatives.
46. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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